



“Our small peace cannot survive alone”

Lessons in peacebuilding and economic development
in South Sudan



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Sudan has endured many decades of violent conflict. To escape from the cycle of destruction and revenge, the Compromise Peace Agreement signed in August 2015 presents an opportunity for national authorities and the international community to adopt a new approach. A technical focus on institution-building at the national level must be balanced with the delivery of tangible peace dividends across the country. Community reconciliation and economic development should be treated as two sides of the same coin, and given equal weight in strategy decisions from national authorities and donors.

This paper draws on CARE's integrated approach to peacebuilding and economic development, and suggests how the lessons learnt from local initiatives can inform larger scale strategies. Improved alignment between community and national reconciliation mechanisms is also discussed. Research for this paper took place in October 2015 in Maiwut County, Upper Nile state, and in Juba, with a range of international, national and community level stakeholders.

Key lessons include:

- **Peace and economic development are naturally aligned at the community level.** Trading links and small business activity can act as a force for peace between communities. Within communities, peace structures can help strengthen economic activity and vice versa.
- **Peace and development should be equally important goals in economic investment decisions.** Private, public and international investments should explicitly aim to provide peace as well as economic benefits. Line ministries established by the peace deal have a particularly important role to play.
- **Dispute resolution mechanisms in communities are robust, but can be further reinforced.** Attention should be paid to supporting reconciliation and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in the 523 *payams* in South Sudan, as well as on closing the gap with the country's formal justice system.
- **Community reconciliation and development should be linked to national mechanisms.** The architecture for peace and reconciliation laid out in the peace deal must link to the *payam* level. Fully resourced, a national structure could build on initiatives started by previous reconciliation structures and the outreach capacity of the churches.
- **Community peace without national reconciliation is unsustainable, and vice versa.** The peace deal is by no means the end of the conflict but marks a milestone in removing some of the obstacles to peace. Peace can only progress with attention to both community and national conflict dynamics.

Peace will come slowly to South Sudan, led by a mix of traditional, governmental, religious and civil society actors, and with patient and flexible support from the international community. All humanitarian and development actors, including the UN, should play their part by ensuring their work is conflict-sensitive and gender-sensitive, supporting peace and doing no harm.

INTRODUCTION

Violent conflict did not end in South Sudan with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. The latest crisis that began in December 2013 is one episode in decades of intermittent war that has left countless thousands dead and a nation in trauma. Current analysis suggests that after independence in 2011 many in the international community, in their strategies to support the new nation, failed to factor in ongoing violence or prioritise community reconciliation around the country.¹ When the current crisis began, the failure to address unresolved and deep-seated grievances between South Sudan's many groups meant fighting spread at a frightening speed. One clear lesson is that community level and inter-community reconciliation must be fundamental to all humanitarian and development efforts.²

This paper draws on CARE's integrated approach to economic development and peacebuilding (with a focus on work in Upper Nile State) and outlines how the lessons learnt from local initiatives for peace and economic development can inform larger scale strategies, and how community and national reconciliation mechanisms can be better aligned. CARE's peacebuilding and economic development work in South Sudan takes the approach that **if** diverse and legitimate peace committees demonstrate benefits of non-violent conflict resolution; **if** 'at risk' groups are engaged and given skills training for greater economic independence; and **if** local enterprises are supported through access to credit and skills; **then** incentives for peace will improve as decent livelihoods, income and community security increase.

In the best-case scenario, where the August 2015 Compromise Peace Agreement³ holds, the country will not arrive at a post-conflict paradigm for at least a generation. Peace will come slowly, led by a mix of traditional, governmental, religious and civil society actors, and with patient and flexible support from the international community. A key conclusion of this paper is that both peacebuilding and economic objectives should be given equal weight in all investment strategies by government ministries, donors and aid agencies.

In a more challenging scenario, where the Peace Agreement does not hold, it is essential that initiatives to reinforce peace, reconciliation and economic development are prioritised for both development and humanitarian interventions at the community level, and that all programming follows 'do no harm' principles.

The period of 2011–2013 must serve as a warning to donors and the new South Sudanese authorities alike: to ignore the history and realities of conflict in South Sudan will be to do significant harm. A new approach is needed.

METHODOLOGY

Field research for this paper was conducted in late October 2015 in Maiwut County, Upper Nile State, where CARE's peace and development work is most established. CARE interviewed approximately 50 key informants (of whom 40% were women) from peace committees, small business owners, local authorities, national and international NGOs, CARE staff and community members. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups in English and Nuer (via a translator). Additional desk research and CARE assessment reports complemented these discussions. The research was not intended to be exhaustive but serves to give a snapshot of one area of the country and to validate some of the themes emerging from national-level discussions.

PEACE COMMITTEES AND MICRO-ENTREPRENEURS IN MAIWUT COUNTY

CARE has been operating in southern Sudan since 1993, most recently providing assistance in health, nutrition, food security and livelihoods, peacebuilding and gender-based violence prevention across South Sudan's three hardest-hit states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei, as well as in Eastern Equatoria.

CARE began its Peace Under Construction (PUC) programme before the crisis in late 2013. Funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the project is being implemented in 18 *payams*⁴ in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Originally designed to strengthen local capacities for peace, improve livelihoods and create peace dividends for vulnerable women and unemployed youth and strengthen accountability of local authorities, the PUC programming was suspended when the conflict began in December 2013 and redesigned before restarting in January 2015. In Maiwut County, CARE supports one peace committee and two 25-person Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in each of four *payams*. At the time of the research, Maiwut County was categorised as at IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) Category 4 (Emergency), and food distributions from aid agencies were underway.

Each peace committee numbers around a dozen members, of whom around half are women. Committees also include a mix of youth, elders, and a traditional community leader as well as a religious authority. Each committee mediates around two disputes a month ranging from theft, adultery or land boundary disputes to more serious crimes of rape and murder. Linked to this, a youth committee has also formed in each *payam* bringing relatively isolated young women, as

well as young men at risk of gang violence, together for sport and activities, giving them an opportunity to spend time constructively.

Women make up more than 80% of VSLA membership. Repayment rates are high and because VSLA members choose who can join the group, trust among the members is strong. Most members use their capital for retail, starting small shops selling fuel, beer, sugar, coffee or tea. A social fund, where a small percentage of profits is put aside to invest in a community project, is also accumulating capital. Evidence from this research in three *payams* in Maiwut County indicates a measurable increase in revenue and improved livelihoods for members of the VSLAs. All VSLA members said they were supporting internally displaced people (IDPs) in some way with food or shelter, thereby acting as a significant shock absorber to the crisis.

Adapting the VSLA model in conflict and post-conflict contexts

In the Maiwut County area, savings groups offer the chance to both raise local incomes and empower women economically. Other market recovery options might not work as well. Even if formal financial institutions existed locally, the conflict has disrupted mobile phone technology, ruling out electronic money transfers. Likewise, the closure of the border has removed cash programming options for humanitarian relief, as traders cannot legally cross with large quantities of goods.

Rather than using micro-savings as would happen in more stable contexts, CARE instead gives each VSLA a small block grant, meaning that members with very little resources can immediately benefit from the rotating loan. The loan still generates interest, and members add savings, and so at the end of the VSLA cycle the members still accrue an appreciated share of the capital. But by not starting from scratch, the group's savings take much less time to mature. The capital loan is then withdrawn and moved to start another VSLA. This is an adapted design and needs further tracking to see whether it delivers the wider benefits of more traditional savings-led VSLAs.

GENDER ROLES AND ECONOMIC MARKETS

Traditional gender roles in South Sudan are very rigid.⁵ Nevertheless, in Maiwut County there were some examples given by participants in the research that suggested that economic necessity had led to greater flexibility in gender roles, with some men collecting firewood and some women acting as porters. One woman entrepreneur said "[the husbands] like that we are in business because we are bringing home food for our children." However, other examples showed women being over-burdened with their

existing traditional roles along with their new business tasks. It is also true that there may be more support for women's engagement in economic activities and peacebuilding in some places than in others. To prevent a backlash, CARE's approach to women's empowerment in economic and peacebuilding spaces is done sensitively, engaging men and boys as well as women and girls in the dialogue about gender roles, and ensuring community leaders support the groups.

EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LINKED TO PEACE

Drawing on International Alert's 2015 framework for integrating peacebuilding into economic development,⁶ CARE's work in Maiwut County can be seen to be contributing in several areas which, given the local political economy, bring peace-related outcomes at the micro level.

The VSLA groups provide key capital through rotating loans, allowing the economy to be (marginally) more diversified from traditional pastoralist-only pursuits. At the same time, investment in business training and planned vocational training of youth is building the human capital for development. Alongside this, the work of the peace committees is contributing to security by limiting and resolving violent conflict. In turn, youth engagement activities, the VSLAs, and the mediating role of the committees, have together made a contribution to building the relationships and trust necessary for resolving conflict and promoting business.

Crucially, the local political economy does not appear to be negating these efforts. Strict social and gender norms have in this case loosened sufficiently during the crisis to enable women to play a more visible role in business and conflict management. The dominance of pastoralist activities, fundamental to local culture, is not threatened; nor is traditional dispute resolution. The local security authorities, whose capacity and budget is limited, welcome the committees for their conflict prevention capabilities. Authority figures, including traditional and church leaders, are included on the committee, ensuring their roles are not threatened or duplicated. The capacity of the VSLA and peace groups to act as shock absorbers to the conditions created by the conflict, for example addressing insecurity and fear, and helping to bear the cost of supporting IDPs, also means they have broad support from community members.

These gains, however, are precarious in the current conflict. Capital cannot be safely accumulated without access to formal financial services. Any increase in insecurity could see assets and capital lost.

The main result of CARE's economic and peace programming has been to secure higher rates of internal community cohesion and peace within the *payams*. Inter-tribal reconciliation in the area may struggle for as long as the

conflict endures, but even in this context there is some evidence of dispute resolution between clans.⁷ In a post-conflict phase, economic activities that seek to unite divided groups around shared economic interests should be possible, particularly when accompanied by traditional reconciliation processes.

APPLYING LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

The August 2015 Peace Agreement outlines three mechanisms for peace and reconciliation: a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), a Hybrid Court, and a Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA). This briefing note argues that for peace to hold across South Sudan, mechanisms for justice and reconciliation must be linked from the community level upwards. At the same time, all efforts to rebuild the country must be planned with a view to consolidating and reinforcing peace rather than dividing communities further. What must not happen is a return to an overly technical focus on institutional reform, with little or no thought to the violent reality of the lives of the people in South Sudan.

Evidence from around the country, including from CARE's peace and economic development programming in Upper Nile and Jonglei, suggests that there are clear lessons for how community-driven peace processes can contribute to national reconciliation.

Lesson 1: Dispute resolution mechanisms in communities are robust, but they can be reinforced

In CARE's experience, local mechanisms for resolving conflict are functional, from tribal courts to neighbourly mediation. These can be further strengthened by diversifying the group responsible for resolving disputes, including the participation of women and youth, while retaining traditional and religious leaders. While CARE's work focuses on strengthening community cohesion, other examples from around the country suggest that community-level peace deals have been negotiated by local leaders or trusted third parties throughout the conflict. For instance, in Jonglei, the Lou-Nuer and Muerle reached out to each other through elders, while church and county commissioners mediated a peace deal signed by the communities of Nyirol, Uror, Twic East and Duk counties.

One size does not fit all and some local peace structures require very little support to engage in day-to-day conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the gap between formal and informal structures can be large. With judgements based on compensation, traditional peace structures seem fundamentally unable to address the drivers of violence or

crime in South Sudan, including a culture of revenge killings. Equally, while they uphold customary law, they are weaker on reflecting national laws which have many protections and provisions for women and children that are not upheld at the community level. Government or international community support to local peace structures, including supporting links between the formal justice system and traditional mechanisms, will therefore require careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.

Lesson 2: Peace and economic development are naturally aligned at the community level

Throughout the conflict in South Sudan, many communities in the most conflict-affected areas have succeeded in maintaining contact with each other, often for the purposes of trade and livelihoods. In Upper Nile, the Lou-Nuer, Dinka Duk and Dinka Twic East groups have maintained links to trade cattle despite roads being cut off by front lines. In 2014, the national Protection Cluster recorded how, in southern Unity State, the continued movement between the Dinka Agar and Nuer from Panyijar for the purpose of trade meant anticipated conflict between the groups did not materialise as expected.⁸

Within communities at the *payam* level, peace committees established by CARE in Upper Nile show every possibility of becoming hubs for economic development. The committees' engagement with youth has led to high demand for vocational training for young people, including young men most at risk of joining armed groups. The success of the VSLAs is also helping to generate social funds that can be used for wider community cohesion and benefit economic development.

If developed, this model of diverse *payam*-level peace committees offering a space for training and livelihoods support could become a significant asset for peaceful community development. One risk of this approach is that broadening the mandate of peace committees to include economic development could risk concentrating power in the hands of an already influential group. Again, no one model is appropriate everywhere, and actors working to reinforce community peace and development structures should proceed with caution, sensitivity and a bias towards flexibility.

Lesson 3: Community reconciliation and development should be linked to national mechanisms

In discussions with community peace committees, each expressed an interest in being part of a larger process of national reconciliation and healing. There are 523 *payams* in South Sudan.⁹ If each *payam* had a peace committee, linked to a county coordinator, in turn linked to a state peace group, and onwards to the national Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Health (CTRH), both traditional

and formal mechanisms could start to align. This could mirror, in part, the structure piloted by the South Sudanese Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR). Major logistical and communications challenges would not make this a simple operation, but donors or authorities could support mixed gender representatives from each level to meet regularly and ensure the integration of community though to national reconciliation processes. Crucially, this would help to engage community-level groups in discussions about forgiveness and the accountability of those responsible for war crimes.

Likewise, the establishment of the Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA), to provide material and financial support to citizens whose property was destroyed by the conflict and to manage reparations, could be integrated into this national multi-level structure. While responding to individual need, county and state groups could use this fund to invest in economic development work that could provide a peace benefit to divided groups.

This strategy would not be without risks. The conflicting plans for federalism established by the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) risk politicising any structures from the county level upwards. Moreover, the political economy of peace is not neutral, and once peace structures have the power to award financial compensation, there is a further risk of them becoming contested. Existing work by church groups involved in peace, including the training of peace mobilisers and the South Sudan Council of Churches' grassroots peace strategy, could be crucial in mitigating some of the risks of politicisation, as well as meeting the logistical challenges of supporting links between local, state and national-level groups.

Lesson 4: Peace and development should be equally important goals in economic investment decisions

The oil sector provides the vast majority of South Sudan's public revenues and has been at the heart of conflict in the region over the past 40 years. Consequently it has been the focus of thinking on how careful attention to conflict dynamics in decision-making could strengthen peace.¹⁰ However, most South Sudanese are not involved in oil-related activities, and attention needs to focus on their livelihoods also. Managed well, inclusive macro-economic growth can deliver outcomes conducive to peace including viable livelihoods, safe accumulation of capital, greater revenue, improved access to services, and social and environmental sustainability.¹¹

The proposed Enterprise Development Fund (EDF) and the Economic and Financial Management Authority are the bodies set up by the Compromise Peace Agreement to drive private sector economic growth and diversify the economy. Along

with donors working on livelihood and economic growth programming, these groups should give both an economic and a peace justification for their growth strategies. This is vital to ensuring that economic development approaches do not exacerbate existing tensions by ignoring conflict and potentially doing harm through enflaming competition over vested interests. For instance, the new Youth Enterprise Development Fund set up under the EDF should be mindful of the conflict and seek to create job opportunities equitably across the diverse communities of South Sudan and across genders. However, it could go further, and with an objective for peace it should work with the private sector to create opportunities to build ties between young people from across divided groups. Likewise, the micro-finance facilities set up by the EDF should take a strongly gender-sensitive approach, seeking to empower women economically by developing micro-savings elements to their strategy, and working with communities, leaders and men to raise their acceptance of women entrepreneurs and prevent a possible backlash against them.

Public funding should also seek to follow the same rule of combining peace and development goals. The 13 line ministries in the 'Economic Cluster'¹² should develop peacebuilding strategies within their economic objectives. For instance, investments in agriculture in more stable areas within states should, at the same time, make a deliberate effort to re-establish market access and livelihoods work in politically fragile areas. Road construction could be better coordinated through pooled funds and designed to not only link economically productive parts of the country to markets, but also to link the most isolated communities, and those areas hardest hit by the conflict, into the wider country.¹³ Similarly, efforts to diversify the economy, build human capital and other peace-related investments should look to create value chains between divided groups, benefiting both men and women, so that economic interests can be shared and used to anchor peace through economic cooperation. For instance, dairy value chains or shared veterinary services could be piloted to attempt to strengthen links between pastoralist Nuer and Dinka in areas such as Duk.

Fundamental to programming designed to produce both peace and economic outcomes will be an understanding of the conflict dynamics and peace and reconciliation structures around the country. For both donors and the authorities, flexibility, patience and long-term commitment is vital.

Lesson 5: Community peace without national reconciliation is unsustainable – and vice versa

In the words of a member of the Pagak peace committee, "There is peace in Pagak, but there is no peace in South Sudan. We have to stop the fighting and bring peace to the whole country, otherwise our small peace cannot survive alone."¹⁴

While the national peace impacts on each community's sense of security and well-being, the reverse is also true. Without addressing the sometimes intense levels of violence between individuals and groups in South Sudan, there will always be grievances, trauma and dissatisfaction that can be weaponised for political ends. Equally, as long as a culture of violence, revenge and gender inequality prevails, violent responses to disagreements will remain a valid option in both society and politics.

The peace deal is by no means the end of the conflict but marks a milestone in removing some of the obstacles to peace. All parties to the deal must implement their commitments in good faith, with the support, encouragement and pressure of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission as outlined in the Compromise Peace Agreement.

Lesson 6: Leadership is vital

In addition to the appropriate infrastructure, the implementation of peace requires strong and inclusive leadership. It is clear from both past peace processes and current activities that the different churches in South Sudan must continue to have a key role in national healing.¹⁵ Examples such as the work of Bishop Paride Taban in Kuron in Eastern Equatoria can inform and inspire ideas for reconciliation in other parts of the country.¹⁶ Nevertheless, for the new commission to succeed, it must remain a body respected by all sides and take lessons from valuable processes undertaken by previous bodies such as the CNHPR. The selection of the chair of the new CTRH will be a key decision and will require consensus from all sides. The body must also be diverse, drawing on talents from multiple ethnic groups, a variety of religious denominations, and both men and women.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“What do I want from peace? The crisis has had a severe impact. The lack of food and clean water here, there is hunger and everything is shared with [IDPs]. Before the crisis the state education system functioned, but now it is gone. Peace would be supported here if the government could provide our basic services. If the government could improve the roads that would be a big help for my business, but more than that I would like the border [with Ethiopia] to be open as it was before the conflict.”

– *Female business leader in Pagak*¹⁷

Long-term peace in South Sudan will require all parties to the conflict to abide by the terms of the Compromise Peace Agreement, respect the cessation of hostilities, and use all influence to encourage other violent actors and groups to cease fighting and engage in the peace process. It will require long-term inclusive peace efforts that include the creation of a national peace structure; building on work from previous peace commissions; taking steps through consensus appointments to not politicise the body; and ensuring equal participation of women on all peace structures in the country.

In particular, building a peaceful South Sudan must mean working beyond Juba, with a local-level focus ensuring an integrated approach to economic development and peacebuilding through the following actions:

National authorities should:

- Support community reconciliation by demonstrating cooperation, carefully choosing language that does not stigmatise individuals or groups based on their identity, and encouraging acts of reconciliation between divided groups.
- Direct county and state officials to work closely with traditional peace structures at the *payam* level to close the gap between formal and customary structures, and build county and state capacity in national legal codes to ensure judgements respect human rights and support the rule of law.
- Include both peace and economic objectives in the development of investment strategies by all line ministries, so that all development efforts, including high value economic activities such as oil extraction, act as forces for peace and not conflict.
- Invest in micro-savings alongside micro-finance models, with a strong emphasis on gender by both empowering women and ensuring that careful analysis and preparation work is undertaken before initiatives are implemented to avoid a backlash against women entrepreneurs.

Donors should:

- Learn from the period of 2011-2013 and not rapidly treat South Sudan as a post-conflict country based on the formal peace agreement. Instead, balance any focus on technical institution building at the national level with a concerted and patient effort to address community-level conflict dynamics and reconciliation. In particular, donors should embed peace objectives in economic development programming, and measure their effectiveness at addressing drivers of violence or delivering a peace dividend to cooperating groups.
- Support peace actors in South Sudan to design and develop an integrated national peace and reconciliation architecture. Include appropriate and tailored support for peace committees in each of the 523 *payams* in South Sudan, as well as ensure that all the mechanisms of peace and reconciliation outlined in the peace agreement are fully resourced.
- Move away from rigid planning and instead reward initiatives that are responsive to changing circumstances in a volatile programming environment. This will encourage partners to closely monitor and learn from their shifting environment and will maximise their ability to contribute to peace processes.

All humanitarian and development actors, including UN agencies and donors, should:

- Ensure humanitarian aid is conflict-sensitive and does no harm, including:
 - a. Take the time to understand conflict dynamics in areas of operation, and carefully support groups, structures and activities bringing divided groups together.
 - b. Livelihoods, food security and market access work should map and then support those trading routes and exchanges that have survived the conflict and which may act as a source of cohesion between divided groups.
 - c. Ensure their own staff demographics reflect the diversity of the country.
- Continue to champion gender transformative programming by sensitively working to reach equal participation and representation of women in humanitarian peace and economic development initiatives.

NOTES

All URLs accessed November 2015.

¹ The UK Parliament's All Party Parliamentary Group on South Sudan report published in January 2015 lists numerous types of conflict which passed apparently unremarked including resurgent war in Jonglei and Unity, violent skirmishes involving numerous tribes, massive proliferation of small arms, cattle raiding, militia rebellions and widespread domestic violence. All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan (2015), Bridging the gaps: Lessons from international engagement with South Sudan 2011-2014, www.cmi.no/file/2989-APPGSouthSudanReport-Jan2015.pdf

² 'Opportunities and challenges for peace building and reconciliation in South Sudan', unpublished 2015 paper by Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen, advisor at the South Sudan Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation.

³ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, 2015) Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCeLBQZVAXbjhUc1FmSHo3VnNaT09Ldm1GNEhz/view?pli=1>

⁴ The second lowest administrative unit in South Sudan, after states and counties.

⁵ CARE International (2014) The girl has no rights: Gender-based violence in South Sudan, http://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/CARE_The_Girl_Has_No_Rights_GBV_in_South_Sudan.pdf

⁶ This framework defines seven 'levers' of change which can lead to peace-conducive economic outcomes: 1 The make-up of the economy, 2 Human capital, 3 Relationships, 4 Rule of law, 5 Security, 6 Infrastructure, 7 Land and capital. International Alert (2015), Peace through prosperity: Integrating peacebuilding into economic development, www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/peace-through-prosperity

⁷ For example, the neighbouring Nuer and Burun communities in Greater Maiwut took opposing sides in the conflict. Previously, inter-marriage and trade in mangos, among other items, was common. Following destructive attacks on the Burun by Nuer and the escape of survivors to Ethiopia, the relationship has collapsed. In August 2015 the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) leadership appointed a Burun as Deputy County Commissioner but at the time of writing the appointee, fearing for his personal safety, has refused to travel from Ethiopia to take the position.

⁸ Conflict and Protection Note on Lakes State, South Sudan Protection Cluster (October 2014 update)

⁹ South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (SSNBS, 2008); see https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/datasets/SS_admbndt_adm3_ssnbs_2008.xlsx

¹⁰ Global Witness (2015) Turning the tide: Building a clean oil sector through South Sudan's Peace Agreement, <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/turning-tide-full>

¹¹ International Alert (2015), *op cit*

¹² The Economic Cluster in the Compromise Peace Agreement consists of Finance and Planning; Petroleum; Mining; Agriculture and Food Security; Livestock and Fisheries; Trade and Industry; Energy and Dams; Transport; Roads and Bridges; Environment and Forestry; Land, Housing and Urban Development; Water Resources and Irrigation; Wildlife Conservation and Tourism.

¹³ The APPG report noted that a country-wide network of all-weather roads could have done more for security, governance, agriculture, commerce and development than the 120 projects, costing up to \$1bn, which were implemented across 10 sectors and sub-sectors in 2012/3. All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan (2015), *op cit*

¹⁴ Interview with CARE. Name withheld to protect privacy.

¹⁵ Von Habsburg-Lothringen (*op cit*) notes that four out of the last five key national and sub-national initiatives in South Sudan have been led by church leaders.

¹⁶ See www.kuronvillage.net

¹⁷ Interview with CARE. Name withheld to protect privacy.